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essentially personal in its nature that no obligation survives the death
of the promisor.
8
We have found that this is a personal service contract. We have
discovered that the general rule in New York and throughout the
United States is that contracts involving personal service do not sur-
vive. The tendency of our courts is to abide by the rule laid down by
precedent and judicial opinion where common justice and public
policy do not demand a change.
The rule may seem harsh when we consider that the plaintiff is
living a life of torture, unable to associate with friends and com-
panions and with no means of support. But the inoculation took
place six years prior to this agreement and formed no part of the
consideration. The plaintiff knew what she was contracting for and,
in our opinion, no injustice was wrought. It must be borne in mind
that practical justice can only be the measure of what would be fair
in the greatest number of cases.
Public policy in this case, far from being a reason for disregard-
ing precedent, demands that the law should not be changed. The
state is constantly endeavoring to improve health conditions and the
courts should encourage this good work by refusing its aid to des-
perate persons, unwise persons--criminal offenders who, for pecuni-
ary compensation, agree knowingly and foreseeingly to contracts
which endanger their own health and that of the community. If we
should allow recovery to this plaintiff who subjected herself abso-
lutely to the control of a person to do as he saw fit, experimenting to
the injury of her health, it would encourage other people to do like-
wise in similar cases.
THOMAS E. McDADE.
SAVINGS BANK TRUST DEPOSITS AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS.
It is today the law of this jurisdiction that where A deposits
money in a savings bank in his own name, in trust for B, it does not
in itself establish an irrevocable trust, during the life-time of the
depositor, but is merely a tentative trust, revocable at the depositor's
will, until his death or until such time as he completes the gift in his
life-time by some unequivocal act or declaration. At his death a pre-
sumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to those funds
'It might well be contended however that at the death of DeWitt, plain-
tiff's obligation under the contract had been fulfilled. The main object of the
agreement being to allow him to experiment on her physical person, it follows
that there was nothing more for her to do in pursuance of the contract, because
the contemplated purpose of the contract had been effected.
NOTES AND COMMENT
remaining on deposit.' The legal effect of the savings bank deposit
in this state has been developed through a series of interesting de-
cisions, in which the courts have indicated an intention to keep step
with the changing ideas and purposes of depositors with respect to
this particular type of trust.
In an early case 2 decided by the Court of Appeals an intestate
deposited $500 in a savings bank, declaring that she wished the
account opened in trust for the plaintiff, a distant relative. Entry
was made on the books of the bank and on the pass-book, which was
delivered to and retained by the intestate till after her death, no
change being made in the account except that she drew out interest
for one year. No other act or declaration bearing on her intention
was shown. Plaintiff knew nothing of the deposit till after the death
of the intestate. It was contended by the administrator who defended
the action that the transaction did not transfer the property and that
there was not a sufficient declaration of trust; that by retaining the
pass-book, the intestate never parted with control of the property.
The view of the court was that an irrevocable trust was created, the
money having been deposited unqualifiedly and absolutely in trust,
the intestate being the trustee. Her act in retaining the pass-book
was viewed as not inconsistent with her acts as trustee of the fund.
In arriving at this decision, the court was guided to a considerable
degree by several early English cases, holding that an instrument
executed as a present and complete assignment is equivalent to a
declaration of trust; but it is interesting to note in view of the con-
struction subsequently given to the tentative trust in this jurisdiction,
that these cases did not involve savings bank deposits. 3
The passing of years was marked by a rapid expansion of busi-
ness and the banks became more firmly established in the confidence
of the public. The courts were faced with new problems and changed
conditions. By subsequent decisions the law with relation to savings
bank trust deposits advanced a step. In Mabie v. Bailey 4 money was
deposited by the decedent in trust for the beneficiary. Decedent
showed the pass-book to the beneficiary's mother and, in subsequent
conversations, recognized the deposits as a provision for the family,
no change of intention on his part being indicated. In giving judg-
ment for the beneficiary, the plaintiff in the action, the court held
that an irrevocable trust was established. The question of admissibil-
ity of evidence to show the depositor's intent was raised and, Judge
Andrews, speaking for the court, though not expressly deciding the
point, indicated a growing tendency on the part of the court to limit
the broad rule laid down in Martin v. Funk: 5
'Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1903).
Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, 31 Am. Rep. 446 C1878).
'Richardson v. Richardson, L. R. 3, Equity Cases 686 (1867); Morgan
v. Malleson, L. R. 10, Equity Cases 475 (1870); Warriner v. Rogers, L. R.
16, Equity Cases 340 (1873) ; Pye's Case 18, Vesey 140 (1811).
'95 N. Y. 209 (1884).
'Supra Note 2.
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"* * * the character of such a transaction as creating a
trust is not conclusively established by the mere fact of the
deposit, so as to preclude evidence of contemporaneous facts
and circumstances constituting res gestw, to show that the real
motive of the depositor was not to create a trust, but to
accomplish some independent and different purpose inconsis-
tent with an intention to divest himself of the beneficial owner-
ship of the fund." 6
It is not surprising, then, that when the question was squarely
before the court in a subsequent case, they carried the rule to the
conclusion suggested by the dicta of Andrews, J., in the Mabie case.7
In Beaver v. Beaver 8 a father deposited money in the name of his
son, who pre-deceased him. The court refused to find that a trust
was created from the form of deposit, without more, declaring that
in order to constitute a trust there must be an explicit declaration of
trust or other circumstances which show, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that a trust was intended to be created.9 The Court in this case ex-
pressly recognized the growing tendency of people to employ the
savings bank trust arrangement for purposes other than that of
making gifts to some named beneficiary. 10
The intention of the courts to dispense with the reasoning em-
ployed in Martin v. Funk 11 and to consider the effect of the savings
bank trust in the light of the purposes for which it was being used,
as indicated by the decision in the Beaver case,12 was firmly estab-
lished in the Matter of Totten,13 now the leading case on the subject
in this jurisdiction, in which the rule 14 was definitely stated to be:
"* * * a deposit by one person of his own money, in his own
name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish
0Supra Note 4, at 210.TSupra Note 4.8 117 N. Y. 421, 22 N. E. 940 (1889).
. Matter of Bolin, 136 N. Y. 177, 32 N. E_. 626 (1892); Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 39 App. Div. 99, aff'd 161 N. Y. 554, 56 N. E. 116 (1900); Bath
Savings Inst. v. Hathorn, 88 Me. 122, 33 AtI. 836 (1895); Kelley v. Snow,
185 Mass. 288, 70 N. E. 89 (1904); Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. St. 235, 69 Atl.
807 (1908).
" "We cannot close our eyes to the well known practice of persons deposit-
ing in savings banks money to the credit of real or fictitious persons, with no
intention of divesting themselves of ownership. It is attributable to various
reasons; reasons connected with taxation; rules of the bank limiting the amount
which any one individual may keep on deposit; the desire to obtain high rates
of interest where there is a discrimination based on the amount of deposits,
and the desire on the part of many persons to veil or conceal from others
knowledge of their pecuniary condition." Supra Note 8, at 430, 22 N. E.,
at 942.
n Supra Note 2.2 Supra Note 10.3 Supra Note 1.
" Supra Note 1, at 125, 71 N. E., at 752
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an irrevocable trust during the life-time of the depositor. It is
a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor
dies or completes the gift in his life-time by some unequivocal
act or declaration, such as delivery of the pass-book 15 or notice
to the beneficiary.16  In case the depositor dies before the
beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declara-
tion, such as delivery of the pass-book or notice to the
beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declara-
tion of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute
trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the
depositor.17 "
Because of the development of this branch of the law, which
allows an individual to establish what appears to be a trust complete
on its face, and yet still retain control of the trust res until his death
or some unequivocal act on his part with relation to the deposit, the
question is an interesting one whether or not a creditor of the trustee
may proceed against these funds to satisfy a debt, before the death of
the donor, and after his death, his estate being insufficient to satisfy
the valid demands against it. It seems settled, that in view of the
policy of the law to regard the deposit as an uncompleted gift during
the depositor's life-time, the fund would not be immune from his
creditors. The rights of his creditors after his death deserves further
consideration. In Hallett v. Thompson 18 a legacy was bequeathed
absolutely to the defendant by his wife, but by the will the executors
were directed to retain it in their hands and put it on interest, and to
pay the annual interest to the legatee for life, unless he should by a
legal written instrument require the payment of the principal of the
SMatter of Duffy, 127 App. Div. 74, 111 N. Y. Supp. 77 (2nd Dept.,
1908). (A deposit was made in trust for the beneficiary, who predeceased
the depositor. Plaintiff, as next-of-kin and heir-at-law of beneficiary, claimed
fund was a gift causa mortis. Delivery is essential to such a gift. Beneficiary
died in possession of the book. This created a presumption it was delivered
to her. But the possession of plaintiff rested on a presumption that she obtained
the book from the beneficiary, and the possession of the beneficiary gave rise
to a presumption that there was a delivery of the book to her by the depositor.
This was basing a presumption on a presumption and was not admissible.)
'Matter of U. S. Trust Co., 117 App. Div. 178, 102 N. Y. Supp. 271,
aff'd 189 N. Y. 500 (1907). (A father made a deposit in his own name in
trust for his son. He had retained the bank book and had never, so far as
appeared, notified the son of the deposit. The son died before the father. The
latter made no change in the account, which remained in the form stated until
his death. It was held that the trust had never been consummated, but remained
tentative until the son's death, when it lapsed ipso facto.)
'
7Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 122 App. Div. 623, aff'd 195 N. Y. 433, 88 N. E.
750 (1909). (The depositor, after opening account in trust for his son, left
the bank book in his son.s house, but frequently took it away for a short time
for the purpose of having interest written up, etc. He drew out money, or
part of it, and the action was against his executrix. Held, the leaving of the
bank book with the son under the circumstances, which involved a retention
and dominion over it, 'lid not make the trust irrevocable.)8 5 Paige 583 (1836).
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legacy to himself, in which case the whole was to be paid to him.
Action was brought against the defendant by his judgment creditor,
and a decision was rendered for the plaintiff, the Court saying it was
"* * * contrary to sound public policy to permit a person
to have the absolute and uncontrolled ownership of property
for his own purposes and to be able at the same time to keep
it from his creditors." 19
Ullman v. Cameron 20 involved a testamentary trust created by the
defendant's wife, giving him the income of the fund and any part of
the principal as he might desire for the purpose of establishing him in
business. Defendant contended that until he exercised his privilege
to withdraw the fund it remained a trust and therefore immune from
the attack of creditors. The Court denied his argument and rendered
judgment for the creditor. Not involving savings bank trusts and
being brought by creditors of the cestui que trust against the latter
rather than creditors of the settlor against his right in the funds,
these cases are not decisive on the point in question, but are persuasive
with respect to the attitude which the courts adopt in refusing to
sanction a scheme whereby one can have absolute control and dis-
position of a fund up to the time of his death, and at the same time
keep it from his creditors.
The question of the right of a creditor of the depositor to proceed
against the funds after his death was squarely presented in Beakes
Dairy Co. v. Berns,21 wherein a father deposited money in a savings
bank in his name in trust for his son. Having died intestate without
revoking the trust, an action was brought by a creditor to have the
fund applied to his debt, the estate being insufficient. Judgment was
given for the creditor, the Court holding that the fund was a gift
completed only at the instant of the death of the donor. Up to that
time it was his to draw out and do with it as he pleased. That being
so, and it being subject to his creditors during his life-time, it was
held to be available to them after his death as well.
It is submitted that the holding in the Beakes Dairy case 22
reaches a proper conclusion, for it seems that during the life-time of
the depositor, recovery by his creditors against the trust fund is based
on an attack against his right to revoke the trust, which is a property
right. Though the privilege of exercising this right to revoke must
necessarily cease with his demise, yet his creditors are not deprived of
-' Supra at 585.
186 N. Y. 339, 78 N. E. 1074 (1906).
' 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N. Y. Supp. 529 (2nd Dept., 1908, opinion by
Gaynor, J.).
M Supra.
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recovery against the fund, for to allow them to proceed against it
after his death is no different in principle from the situation where a
creditor sues to have his claim enforced against the legacies of a
testator, his debt being unsatisfied in any other way. This conclusion
militates against no principle of economic justice, and is entirely con-
sistent with the interpretation of the effect of the savings bank trust
deposit as viewed by our courts.
DOROTHY SLAYTON.
